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DEFAMATION: A PROPOSED RESOLUTION

DEFAMATION, THE PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL AND MATTERS
OF PUBLIC CONCERN: A PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR FLORIDA*
INTRODUCTION

Contemporary media publications are the major source of news dissemination in American society.' The information they provide or withhold affects
the daily decisions and attitudes of the public. The limits of the media's
freedom and responsibility must be evaluated, however, against the possibility
a publication may invade the sanctity of an individual's reputation.
Prior to 19643 the law of defamation 4 was governed by the common law of
the several states.5 Early common law subjected the defamer to strict liability, 6
DITOR's NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the outstanding note submitted by a Senior Candidate in the Spring 1980 Quarter.
1. The primary purpose for the constitutional protection of a free press is to have a
fourth governmental institution to check the three official branches of government. Stewart,
Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
2. The right of the press to decide what to publish distinguishes the United States
not only from totalitarian nations, but also from nations like Great Britain which impose significant restraints on the material the media may publish. Address by Mr. Justice Stevens,
the University of Arizona College of Law Dedication Ceremony (September 8, 1979), reprinted
in COMMUNICAToNs LAW 1979 105 (Practicing Law Institute).
8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254 (1964) (developed first amendment protection for certain defamation actions brought against the media).
4. Defamation, both libel and slander, may be defined as the unprivileged publication
of false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to another. Cooper v.
Miami Herald Publ. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 299-800, 81 So. 2d 882, 884 (1947). Early common
law distinguished libel (written statements) from slander (oral statements) because libel, at
that time, had a greater potential for widespread dissemination due to undeveloped broadcasting technology. Commander v. Pedersen, 116 Fla. 148, 157, 156 So. 837, 389 (1934). This
distinction is no longer recognized today because there is equal potential for mass publication of both written and oral statements. Teare v. Local Union No. 295, United Ass'n of
Journeymen, 98 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1957); Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d
495, 497 (Fla. 1953). It should be noted that the first amendment, adopted in 1791, does
not distinguish between freedom of speech and press. See U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
5. Defamation, like obscenity and fighting words, received no first amendment protection
due to the belief that this type of speech had minimal social value. See generally Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957) (noting that although ten of the fourteen states
ratifying the Constitution embodied free expression guarantees in their respective constitutions, thirteen of those states had provisions for the prosecution of libel); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 843 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1952) (when the Constitution was adopted there was no
suggestion that the crime of libel should be abolished); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (the social benefits derived through the prevention and punishment
of obscenity, libel and fighting words outweigh any benefits that such speech may provide);
Near v. Minnesota, 288 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (the Constitution does not abolish common
law punishment of the libeler); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (the
Constitution's protection of speech and press does not prevent subsequent punishment of
that which is contrary to the public welfare).
6. See RESTATEMENT or TORTs §578 (1988). For examples of leading early common
law cases applying the doctrine of strict liability, see, e.g., Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 381 (good faith publication that plaintiff's husband was engaged
to another woman); Morrison v. Ritchie, (1904) 4 Fraser (4 Sess. Cas.) 645, 39 Scot. L. Rep.
432 (good faith report that plaintiff gave birth to twins); Hvulton v. Jones [1910] A.C. 20
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unless the publisher affirmatively proved that the statements were either true7
or privileged.8 The defendant was liable regardless of intent, recklessness or
negligence, if he published a statement to a third party that could reasonably
be construed9 as defaming the plaintiff.
The burdensome, often unrebuttable, presumptions-0 placed on the defendant in a defamation suit applied to both the gossiping neighbor and the
event-reporting local newspaper. The press' power to damage those whom it
disfavored and enhance those whom it favored was greatly feared. 1' The courts
promulgated strict rules of law to redress the harm to reputation caused by
defamatory falsehoods. Notably, early local newspaper reporting was naturally
restricted to a relatively confined area because of limited technology and
transportation. Accordingly, investigative and editorial control were relatively
easy to implement. 1 2 However, as early as 1933 the Florida supreme court
realized that reformation of the common law strict liability doctrine was
warranted to accommodate the complexities of a mechanized era.13 The court
(apparently fictitious name corresponded to plaintiff's). The doctrine of strict liability often
led cautious publishers to decide not to publish to avoid the expense of defending against
strict liability. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 737-801 (4th ed. 1971); Developments in the LawDefamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 938-45 (1956).
7. The Florida Constitution of 1885 stated that truth, coupled with good motives, was
a complete defense to criminal or civil libel actions. FLA. CoNsr. art. I, §13 (1885) (current
version at FLA. CONsT. art. I, §4 (1968); adopted the 1885 provision with minor word
changes). But cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (when a federal constitutional
privilege is involved, truth is a complete defense, regardless of motive).
8. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text, infra.
9. The language was interpreted as the "common mind" would naturally construe it.
The jury was instructed to construe the words in view of what they thought they were
intended to convey. McCellan v. L'Engle, 74 Fla. 581, 583, 77 So. 270, 271 (1917). However,
a demurrer, summary judgment or directed verdict could be granted if the judge determined
that the words could not possibly convey a defamatory meaning. Cooper v. Miami Herald
Publ. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 300, 31 So. 2d 382, 384 (1947).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §580 (1938). The procedural rules of evidence placed defamation in two categories-actionable per se and actionable per quod. If the words were defamatory without resort to extrinsic evidence, or per se, then general damages and malice were
presumed as a matter of law. Conversely, if the defamatory characteristic of the statement
depended on the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the suit was labeled actionable per
quod. The plaintiff in a per quod suit was required to alledge and prove special damages
and express malice. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 181-82, 146 So. 234, 236 (1933).
General damages compensate loss resulting from injured feelings, humiliation, anguish and
mental suffering. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d 679, 680-81 (Fla. 1953). Special
damages are proven by actual pecuniary loss. Wolkowsky v. Garfunkel, 65 Fla. 10, 11, 60
So. 791, 791 (1913). Historically, slander per se only included words imputing a felony to
the plaintiff, Commander v. Pedersen, 116 Fla. 148, 154, 156 So. 337, 339 (1934), whereas
libel per se included statements that charged the plaintiff with a felony, a venereal disease,
conduct incompatible with the plaintiff's trade or business, or the unchastity of a woman,
Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So. 2d 241, 244-45 (Fla. 1953). Slander per se was expanded to include
all four categories in Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1953).
11. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 187, 146 So. 234, 239 (1933).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 185, 146 So. at 237.
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concluded that when a media defendant was involved the reputation of the
4
individual was not the only interest that merited protection.
Modern defamation law involves, state and federal 5 determinations of
when an individual's interest"e in his reputation entitles him to compensation
for its degradation, and when that interest must yield to the first amendment
8
7
protection of uninhibited news dissemination.. This balancing process'
ultimately defines the substantive and procedural rules which govern particular
defamation suits.' The 1974 United States Supreme Court decision of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, IncY0 left undefined a standard of fault for defamation
litigation involving non-public figures.21 Fault must be the basis for liability,
14. Id.

15. The body of law developed at both the state and federal levels includes constitutional, statutory and case law. Case law encompasses many refinements on the subject of
defamation. For illustrations of constitutional and statutory materials, see, e.g., U.S. CoNsr.
amend. I; FLA. CoNsr. art. I, §4; FLA. STAT. §§770.01-.08 (1979).
16. At least one Justice has argued that the protection of reputation from invasion and
wrongful hurt is a "private personality" right left primarily to the states under the ninth
and tenth amendments. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 883 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. The first amendment is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
Edwards v. South Carolina, 872 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
18. One commentator states that the law of defamation is not merely a balancing of
reputational interests against media self-censorship. Rather, libel law is the method by which
the courts seek to control the press' power; a satisfactory means of influencing journalistic
decisions will not be found until the courts admit their goal. See Anderson, A Response to
Professor Robertson: The Issue is Control of Press Power, 54 TEx. L. REv. 271, 284 (1976).

But cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 823, 325 (1974) (there must be an appropriate
accommodation between defamation law and the freedom of speech and press); Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 408 U.S. 29, 49-50 (1971) (the protection of an individual's reputation
must often yield to the vital need for a free press); Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 38& U.S. 130,
147 (1967) (an accommodation must be found for the competing interests in all libel
actions); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 883 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (acknowledging the tension between
the first amendment and society's interest in redressing attacks on reputation); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (whether articles on a major issue forfeit
constitutional protection due to their falsity and alleged defamatory character); Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972) (seeking to constitutionally balance the rights
of each party to a defamation suit), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 05 So. 2d 172
(Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Brautigan, 127 So. 2d 718,
722 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.) (precise analysis is required when freedom of expression collides with
the individual's protection of a good reputation), cert. denied, 869 U.S. 821 (1961). See also
Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 204-06 (1976) (analysis of the defamation decisions must focus on the
Court's skill in balancing reputation and first amendment values).
19. The substantive and procedural rules include a determination of which standard
of proof will be required: dear and convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence;
which standard of intent will be applied to the publisher's actions: actual malice or negligence; and which party will have the burden of proving the truth or falsity of the publication. Furthermore, statutes may require notice to the publisher alleging the false and defamatory statements as a condition precedent to instituting a defamation suit, as well as
the preclusion of punitive damages if a retraction is published. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §770.01-.02

(1979).
20. 418 U.S. 823 (1974). See text accompanying notes 118-127 infra.
21. The term "non-public" (private) figure has not been clearly defined by the courts.
But since "public officials" and "public figures" have been defined, these definitions can
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but the states were free to impose a standard of fault which best accommodated
the competing interest involved.2 2 Florida has not developed such a fault
standard, resulting in confusion and speculation among the bench, bar and
commentators.23
be juxtaposed with the facts of a case to determine the plaintiff's status. The term "public
official" is defined as "those among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or
appear to have, substantial responsibility for, or control over, the conduct of governmental
affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971) (deputy chief of detectives); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (former supervisor
of county's recreational area); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (county attorney and
chief of police); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (group of parish judges); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (elected city commissioner). Public figures
may be those deemed public figures for all purposes because they "occupy positions of
persuasive power and influence," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), or
those whose "purposeful activity amount[s] to a thrusting of [their] personality into the
'vortex' of an important public controversy." Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967). See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (real estate developer
seeking zoning change); Walker v. Associated Press, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (retired army general
who assumed a leadership role in a racial demonstration); Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967) (well-known university football coach). See generally Kalven, The Reasonable
Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. RaV. 267, 275-90 (the
Court's definition of public figures is a result of the sequence in which the Court received
the cases); Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from
Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MicH. L. REv. 1547,
1551-56 (1972) (reviewing the Court's public figure cases as a "logical consequence" of
New York Times).
22. 418 U.S. at 347.
23. Florida courts have attempted to delineate a post-,Gertz stance but have not been
successful. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida supreme court's attempt
because it failed to enunciate what standard of fault would be applied in Florida subsequent
to Gertz. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448
(1976). In Karp v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978) (per
curiam), the parties agreed to the trial judge's determination that negligence was the standard
of fault for private plaintiffs. However, the trial court adopted this negligence standard in
reliance on the Florida supreme court's opinion in Firestone. This reliance was erroneous
since the United States Supreme Court had reversed Firestone. See also note 129 infra.
Another district court of appeal stated that under Gertz, private plaintiffs no longer need
prove actual malice. Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974).
However, the court did not state which standard of fault would apply to such defamation
actions. Id. at 651. The only other district court of appeal opinion addressing this issue involved a public figure libel action. The court summarily noted that defamation suits were
governed by a dual standard-one for public figures and another for private individuals. However, this court also neglected to articulate what standard applied to private defamation
suits. Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
The current version of FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CIv.) (1978) utilizes a negligence standard
for defamation claims by non-public figures against news media defendants. FLA. STD. JURY
INsraM. (Csv.) MI 4.3 at 1 (1978). The committee comments state that "[u]ntil there is an
authoritative Florida decision to the contrary, the committee assumes that Florida law requires proof of negligence in such a case." (emphasis added). Id. at 2 n.1 (Notes on Use).
This assumption cannot be read as a mandate for Florida's post-Gertz standard of liability
in defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs because it is not based on Florida
case law.
Compare 1 COMMUNICATIONs LAw 1977 34 (Practicing Law Institute) (relying on Helton
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This note will focus on developing an appropriate standard of fault for
defamation litigation in Florida involving non-public figures and media defendants. 24 Two analyses are used to ascertain the standard of fault that would
be most suitable for Florida defamation suits filed by private plaintiffs involved in matters of public concern. One is a historical analysis of Florida
and federal judicial development of the media's qualified privileges. At the
state and federal levels, "each of the gradual extensions of the media privileges
has placed primary emphasis on the protection of "matters of public or
general interest."'25 This note will argue that media publications continue to
deserve a standard of fault commensurate with the significant function they
serve in a free, informed society, regardless of the plaintiff's status. The second
analysis focuses on the rationales of states which have adopted the two principal standards of fault, actual malice and negligence. A comparison of the
policies and other justifications expressed by these two groups of states with
the doctrines formerly adopted in Florida reveals that the actual malice
standard states capture the philosophy exhibited in Florida law.
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF A QUALIF
TO PUBLISI MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR CONCERN

Mitigation of the harsh strict liability doctrine was accomplished through
the mechanisms of absolute2 6 and qualified privileges. A qualified privilege
v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1974), Florida's post-Gertz position was
classified as "undecided" with a tendency to adopt a standard less than actual malice) with
COMMUNIcAVONs LAW 1979 247 (Practicing Law Institute) (Florida was reclassified as a
simple negligence state relying on Firestone, 305 So. 2d 172 (1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 424
U.S. 448 (1976) and Karp v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978)
(per curiam)).
24. The term "media" means any means of mass communications including, but not
limited to, newspapers, magazines, television and radio broadcasting. Thus, media defendants
include the publication or broadcast itself as well as its publishers, editors, reporters, newscasters and broadcasters. Hereinafter, the terms publication[s], publisher[s] and published
will refer to both written and oral communications.
25. The phrase "matters of public or general concern" first appeared in Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rnzv. 192, 214 (1890). See note 39 infra for
illustrations of the courts' consistent use of this phrase throughout the development of the
media's qualified privilege. But cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (actual
malice standard for matters of public concern no longer mandated).
26. If an absolute privilege were deemed to exist, then neither bad faith nor falsity
would serve to nullify it. Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 245, 21 So. 109, 112 (1897). Absolute
privileges have been extended to legislative and judicial proceedings to promote uninhibited
participation in such proceedings. The absolute privilege in judicial proceedings extends
to the judge, parties, counsel and witnesses. State v. Tillett, III So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1959) (judicial proceedings include grand jury proceedings). The only limitation is the
statement's relevance to the subject matter of the proceedings. If it is not relevant, then
only a qualified privilege is applied. Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 212, 44 So. 357, 362 (1907).
See, e.g., Taylor v. Aleopa Corp., 138 Fla. 137, 189 So. 230 (1939) (words appearing in
pleadings are absolutely privileged if relevant to the proceeding); Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla.
1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) (absolute privilege applies to reports of commissioners and other
functionaries who are required by the court to examine persons and things); Sussman v.
Damiam, 355 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (attorney absolutely privileged to utter relevant
defamatory statements while taking depositions or conversing with opposing counsel); cf.
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arises when the speaker and receiver of the statement have a mutual interest
in the subject matter. 27 Qualified privileges are recognized when societal
interest deems it proper for a person to communicate certain facts to a third
party.28 Significantly, the existence of a qualified privilege shifts the burden
of proving express malice to the plaintiff. 29 In contrast with actionable per

Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (federal officers absolutely privileged to make defamatory statements within the "outer perimeters" of their duties); see also FLA. STAT. §443.16(3)
(1979) (statements from employer or employee to each other or to the Florida Industrial
Commission regarding the requirements of the unemployment compensation law are absolutely privileged); McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966) (letter from county manager to county commission stating why plaintiff was dismissed from office of sheriff is absolutely privileged); Cripe v. Board of Regents, 358 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978) (absolute privilege for defamatory statements contained in required employee evaluations by
department director at state university). But see Merriman v. Lewis, 141 Fla. 832, 194 So.
349 (1940) (defamatory statements by insured to insurer about insured's employee for the
purpose of collecting a claim, with the intent of enforcing the claim in court, if necessary,
is not absolutely privileged).
27. Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 508, 8 So. 2d 12, 14 (1942). One category of
qualified privileges is statements made in connection with various volunteer organizations,
lodges, societies and labor unions. See, e.g., Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1953)
(defamatory statements about a congregant made at a religious group meeting); Frieder v.
Prince, 308 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975) (notice to members of opticians' association
explaining the insufficiency of evidence to remove plaintiff from board of directors). A second
category includes communications between an agent and his principal. See, e.g., Appell v.
Dickinson, 73 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1954) (communication by corporate president to employed
broker concerning broker's employee); Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 8 So. 2d 12 (1942)
(medical report of a required physical examination of an employee). Credit reports compose
a third category. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Personal Fin. Co., 46 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1950) (defamer's statement to credit company upon inquiry invited by debtor is qualifiedly privileged
unless defamer knew it was false); Putnal v. Inman, 76 Fla. 553, 80 So. 316 (1918) (merchants'
association can publish to its members the names of persons with delinquent accounts).
Another category includes character reference reports by former employees. See, e.g., Briggs
v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 825 (1908) (letter from corporate officer regarding the actions
of a former corporate treasurer to indemnity company that had given a surety bond);
Abraham v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591 (1906) (statement by former employer to
present employer concerning employee's past conduct). Publications about judicial proceedings
are also qualifiedly privileged but only if they are accurate and impartial. See, e.g., Walsh v.
Miami Herald Publ. Co., 80 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1955) (newspaper article about the testimony
of a police officer is not qualifiedly privileged unless it is accurate); Shiell v. Metropolis
Co., 102 Fla. 794, 136 So. 537 (1931) (although publications about judicial proceedings are
privileged, a particular publication is privileged only if it is fair, accurate and impartial).
28. Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla, 240, 245, 21 So. 109, 112 (1896). The speaker need not
have spoken under the compulsion of a positive legal duty. A social or moral duty to speak
is sufficient to initiate a qualified privilege. Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 508, 8 So. 2d
12, 14 (1942).
29. Express malice must be distinguished from the constitutional law term "actual
malice." The term "express malice" connotes falsity and "intent to injure." Abram v.
Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 1956), whereas the term "actual malice" refers to the
publisher's "knowledge that [the statementj was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). At
common law, express malice focused on the defendant's attitude towards the plaintiff, while
actual malice focused on the defendant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material
published. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974).
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se30 defamation suits, malice is presumed not to exist when a qualified
privilege is applicable.3 1
Consequently, a qualified privilege for the media to publish matters of
public interest or concern began to develop. The pinnacle of this gradual
evolution was the adoption, by both the Florida and United States Supreme
Courts,

32

of an actual malice standard of fault to accompany this privilege.33

This privilege developed in three stages. The first stage encompassed judicial
recognition of the unique role of the media in a free society, and accordingly,
the need to extend sufficient breathing space 4 to foster their fulfillment of
this role.35 The second stage involved circumscription of the individual's private
sphere.36 The dissemination of information on matters of public concern was
determined to justify the occasional exposure of even those persons who
desired anonymity.37 These two stages culminated in the third stage, the
ratification of a qualified privilege to publish matters of public concern while
38
protected by an actual malice standard of fault.
30. See note 10 supra.
31. Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 245, 21 So. 109, 112 (1896). Although malice can
be inferred from the language itself or through extrinsic evidence, the mere fact of
falsity will not satisfy the plaintiff's affirmative burden of proving malice. Id. Accord, Gibson
v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Abram v.
Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 1956); cf. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)
(the defense of truth is not sufficient protection against self-censorship nor does it adequately
implement first amendment policies); Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967) (if
the publication concerns a matter of great public interest, then falsity will not dissipate
the publisher's constitutional protections); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273
(1964) (factual error will not remove the constitutional privilege to criticize public officials).
However, a qualified privilege may be lost by the manner of its exercise. McClellan v.
L'Engle, 74 Fla. 581, 583, 77 So. 270, 272 (1917).
32. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gibson v. Maloney, 231
So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). See notes 89-117 and accompanying
text, infra.
33. See note 29 supra, for the distinction between express and implied malice. Appropriately, emphasis has shifted from the publisher's attitude about the plaintiff, that is,
express malice, to his attitude about the publication, actual malice. A publisher's responsibility for rapid dissemination of world-wide news necessarily precludes the existence
of a personal relationship, and thus hostility, between the publisher and the actors involved.
Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the journalistic procedures of the publisher and his
employees.
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964), quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1943).
35. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Ross v. Gore, 48
So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950); Cooper v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 31 So. 2d 382 (1947);
Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933). See notes 41-63 and accompanying
text, infra.
36. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); White v. Fletcher, 90 So. 2d
129 (Fla. 1956); Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956). See notes 64-77 and accompanying text, infra.
37. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955). See notes 79-85 and accompanying text, infra.
38. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gibson v. Maloney, 231
So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). But cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (actual malice standard not mandated for private individuals involved
in matters of public interest). See notes 86-117 and accompanying text, infra.
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This metamorphosis exhibited two consistent and significant features.
First, each stage involved a subject matter focus-matters of public concern
or interest3 9 Second, the Florida courts promulgated these developments
prior to the United States Supreme Court's similar adoption.40
Stage One: A FreePress Needs
Adequate BreathingSpace
Responding to the technological advances in the communications and
transportation industries of the 1930s and 1940s, the Florida courts recognized
the local daily newspaper's added responsibility of supplying world-wide news
coverage to its readers. 41 Accordingly, the Florida supreme court extended a
39. See, e.g., Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1974) (the dissemination of
information on "matters of public interest" is an "inalienable right"); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1971) (the common factor in New York Times and its
progeny is a defamatory publication about an event of "public or general interest); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (the opening of a new play was "a matter of public
interest," therefore, recovery must be based on proof of actual malice); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (the first amendment secures treedom of expression
upon public questions); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1972) (media
publications about "matters of public or general interest" are constitutionally protected
even if they relate to private individuals), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 305 So. 2d 172
(Fla. 1974), rev'd 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1970)
("fair comment" on "public matters" is protected by an actual malice standard), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 951 (1975); Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 1956) (the media's qualified
privilege to "publish matters of great public interest" can be triggered by injecting
oneself into the matter); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 37 (la.
1955) (the media has qualified privilege to telecast one who is at the scene of an "occurrence
of public or general interest"); Cooper v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 301, 31
So. 2d 382, 384 (1947) (media publications reflecting an "incident of public interest" axe
not actionable without proof of malice).
40. Compare Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950) (occasional errors by the
newspapers must be tolerated to preserve American democracy which depends on the public
receiving rapid information) with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72
(1964) (erroneous statements by newspapers are inevitable and must be protected in order
to give freedom of expression the "breathing space" it needs to survive. Compare State
ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 94 Fla. 1071, 1073, 114 So. 856, 857 (1927) (candidate for public
office puts his character in issue to the extent it affects his fitness and qualifications for
office) with Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (public discussion about
the qualifications of a public official or candidate is constitutionally protected). Compare
Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 334, 336 (Fla. 1956) (qualified privilege to comment on one who
"injects" himself into a matter of public interest) with Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.
130, 155 (1967) (constitutional protection of publication concerning persons who "thrust"
themselves into the "vortex" of an important public controversy). Compare Jacova v. Southern
Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1955) (one emerges from his seclusion when
he becomes an actor, voluntarily or not, in an event of public interest) with Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (exposure of one's self to others is an inevitable part of life
in a civilized society). Compare Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1970) (actual
malice standard applies to "fair comment" on matters of public interest), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 984 (1973) with Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (actual malice
standard for matters of public or general interest).
41. See, e.g., Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950) (to preserve rapid, free news
dissemination, no unreasonable restraints should be placed on publication of the thousands
of daily news articles on pending matters); Cooper v. Miami Herald PubL. Co., 159 Fla. 296,
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qualified privilege to publications reporting incidents of public interest. Absent
affirmative proof of express malice or abuse of this qualified privilege, falsity
42
would not subject the media to liability for these publications.
Pursuant to this emerging policy, the Florida legislature promulgated civil
and criminal defamation statutes aimed at mitigating the burdens on the
publishing industry. 43 A condition precedent to filing a civil or criminal action
against a publisher was the service of prior written notice specifying the
alleged defamatory, false statements. 44 Failure to give specific notice resulted in
a summary verdict for the defendant-publisher. 45 Further, if the publication
was determined to have been made in good faith and a retraction, correction
301, 31 So. 2d 382, 384 (1947) (consideration must be given to the daily newspaper's responsibility for supplying news and information from the remote comers of the world);
Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 183-85, 146 So. 234, 237-39 (1933) (judicial notice requires recognition that early common law did not take into account the modern institution
of news dissemination).
42. In Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933), a local newspaper reproduced a wire service article about the indictment of a state representative and his
secretary for the possession of whiskey. The article failed to state that the indictment had
been dismissed. Affirming the judgment for the newspaper, the Florida supreme court spoke
extensively about the need to create new defamation doctrines to deal with the complexities
of the modern daily newspaper. Id. at 183-85, 146 So. at 237-39. The court rejected the
common law concept of presumed malice, replacing it with an affirmative requirement of
proof of malice in fact. Id. at 188-89, 146 So. at 239. This new doctrine was extended to
locally originating news items in Cooper v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 31 So. 2d
382 (1947). In Cooper, a local newspaper published an account of a shooting, stating that
it occurred at appellants restaurant. The shooting actually took place a short distance from
the restaurant. The Florida supreme court affirmed a judgment for the newspaper. Again
recognizing the local newspaper's daily responsibility of supplying world-wide news coverage, the court concluded that because the article "simply reflects an incident of public
interest" appellant's failure to prove malice was determinative. Id. at 801, 31 So. 2d at 384.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged Florida's innovative position in CrowellCollier Publ. Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1949). In Caidwell, a newspaper
article charged the governor of Florida with indifference to the lynchings in his state. In
reversing and remanding the excessive verdict for the governor, the court discussed the
Florida supreme court's philosophy in Layne. The court observed that Layne stood for the
proposition that public interests are better served by an extension, rather than a restriction,
of the media's qualified privilege to publish matters affecting the interest of the general
public. Id. at 943. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (acknowledging the "profound national commitment" to "uninhibited, robust and open-wide" debate
on public issues).
43. 1933 Fla. Laws, ch. 16070, §§-2 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§770.01-.02, 836.07-.08
(1979)).
44. 193 Fla. Laws, ch. 16070, §1 (current version at FLA. STAT. §770.01 (1979)). The civil
statute currently reads: "Before any civil action is brought for publication or broadcast in

a newspaper, periodical, or other medium, of a libel or slander, the plaintiff shall, at least
5 days before instituting such action, serve notice in writing on the defendant, specifying
the article or broadcast and the statements therein which he alleges to be false and defamatory." FLA. STAT. §770.01 (1979).
The current criminal statute reads: "Before any criminal action is brought for publication,
in a newspaper periodical, of a libel, the prosecutor shall at least 5 days before instituting
such action serve notice in writing on defendant, specifying the article and the statements
therein which he alleges to be false and defamatory." FLA.
45. See Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
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or apology was published after notice, then civil recovery was limited to
actual damages, and the criminal action was barred.4 6 The constitutionality
of the civil statutes was upheld by the Florida supreme court in Ross v. Gore.4 7
Ross provided the court with an opportunity to articulate its philosophy
concerning a free press. The court concluded that a free press is a vital component of a democratic society48 and that the press' function of policing society
by reporting events through analytical criticism should not be inhibited. 49
Recognition of the unique function of the publishing industry also resulted
in extending to the press greater latitude for error. In Ross, the court reasoned
that occasional errors were both inevitable and excusable because the preservation of democracy depends on rapid news dissemination to the public.50 An
earlier Florida supreme court opinion, recognizing the inevitability of factual
media errors, stressed that libel law should not be used to redress every misstatement in a newspaper's publication."'
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court also concluded that occasional
error must be tolerated as a necessary concomitant of a free and responsive
46. 1933 Fla. Laws, ch. 16070, §2 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§770.02, 836.08 (1979)).
The current civil statute reads: "If it appears upon the trial that said article or broadcast
was published in good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake of the facts, that
there were reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article or broadcast
were true, and that, within 10 days after the service of said notice, a full and fair correction, apology or retraction was, in the case of newspapers and periodicals, published in
the same editions or corresponding issues of the newspaper or periodical in which said
article appeared and in as conspicuous place and type as was said original article or, in the
case of a broadcast, the correction, apology, or retraction was broadcast at a comparable
time, then the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages." FLA. STAT. §770.02
(1979).
The criminal statute currently reads: "If it appears upon the trial that said article was
published in good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake of the facts, and that
there were reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article were true,
and that within 10 days after the service of said notice a full and fair correction, apology
and retraction was published in the same editions or corresponding issues of the newspaper
or periodical in which said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was
said original article, then any criminal proceeding charging libel based on an article so
retracted, shall be discontinued and barred." FLA. STAT. §836.08 (1979).
47. 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950). It was unsuccessfully argued in Ross that FLA. STAT.
§§770.01-.02 violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
they apply only to media defendants. Id. at 414.
48. Id. at 415. "'No government ought to be without censors: and where the press is
free no one ever will."' Id. (emphasis by the court) (quoting Thomas Jefferson). Cf. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (" 'Whatever is added to the field
of libel is taken from the field of free debate.' ") (quoting from Sweeney v. Patterson, 128
F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
49. 48 So. 2d at 415. The court emphasized the importance of not placing unreasonable
restraints on news reporters or editors. Id.
50. Id. The court stressed that the public must receive news on "pending" matters in
time for its opinion to be formulated and expressed. Id. But cf. FLA. CONST. art. I, §4 (1968)
(adopted from FLA. CONsT. art I, §13 (1885)) (if the defamatory statement is true and
published with good motives then the party shall be acquitted).
51. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 184, 146 So. 234, 237 (1933). Accord, McCormick
v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 139 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962) (newspapers cannot
be held to the minute details of the transactions they report).
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press. A unanimous Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 2 declared that
the inevitable erroneous statement must be protected in order to give the
media the breathing space it needs to survive. 53 The Court stressed the national
commitment to the philosophy that discussion on public issues should be uninhibited and robust. 54 In accordance with the toleration and protection of
erroneous statements, the Florida supreme court in Ross, and later the United
States Supreme Court in New York Times, recognized that some degree of
abuse would inevitably occur. Nevertheless, both courts concluded that
occasional abuse was a lesser evil than application of the stringent early
common law doctrines. 5
Significantly, Florida's implementation of special treatment for the media
defendant was based on judicial and legislative recognition of the role of
the modem publisher in a free society. The strict common law policy of redressing every injury to reputation caused by a misstatement was gradually
relaxed. The focus was shifted instead to the promotion: of an informed
6
populace through the receipt of publications on matters of public interest.5
57
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court in New York Times extended
breathing space to the media by transplanting the same strict liability concepts
into an emerging first amendment doctrine.58 The Court proceeded on the
basic premise that the first amendment secured freedom of expression regarding public issues. 59 Therefore libel law as a "formula of suppression" would
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A city official brought a libel action against a newspaper for
printing an advertisement criticizing how the police handled a civil rights protest.
53. Id. at 271-72 (quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
54. Id. at 270. The Court noted that even a false statement may make a valuable
contribution by clarifying and reinforcing the truth when the two collide. Id. at 279 n.19.
Truth as a defense to a defamation suit deters more than false statements due to the
publisher's concern with proving truth in court. Id. at 279.
55. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271; Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d at 415,
56. See also 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 2 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been
logic, but experience.").
57. New York Times has been acclaimed as a landmark case. Dean Prosser stated that
New York Times was "unquestionably the greatest victory won by the defendants in the
modem history of torts." W. PaossER, HANDBOOK ON ThE LAW OF ToRrs 819 (4th ed. 1971).
See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the

First Amendment," 1964 Sus'. CT. REv. 191, 208 (in New* York Times the Court found that
the heart of the first amendment was the protection of speech, and without it our democracy
would cease to function).
58. The first amendment doctrine established in New York Times led to the promulgation of new protections in such areas as commercial advertising, obscenity and privacy.
See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (first amendment right to distribute and receive commercial information);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment privilege to view obscene material
in the privacy of one's own home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479 (1965) (right
to receive birth control information premised on the right of privacy as a penumbra of
the first, fifth and ninth amendments).
59. 376 U.S. at 269. "'The interest of the public here outweighed the interest of
appellant or any other individual. The protection of the public requires not mere discussion, but information.'" Id. at 272, quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (libel action by a congressman based on news article accusing him of anti-semitism), cert. denied, 817 U.S. 678 (1943).
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not be tolerated. 0 Confined to its narrowest interpretation, New York Times
held that a public official could not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
about his official conduct unless he proved that the statement was made with
actual malice. 61 However, the Court's later applications of the basic premise of
New York Times resulted in constitutional protection for a much larger array
of defamation suits.62 The broad-based policies espoused by the Florida supreme
court and the United States Supreme Court required further elucidation.
However, the courts' primary concern with the public's need to receive informa63
tion on public issues served as the guide throughout the refinement process.
Stage Two: Defining the Scope of PublicInterest
Following the development of a qualified privilege for media defendants
based on their unique function in a democratic society, the more difficult
task of defining the limits of this privilege began. This second stage of evolution required a determination of when the reputational and privacy interests
of the individual should succumb to the publisher's desire to disseminate,
and the public's need to receive, information'on public issues. The core of
analysis was privacy, 4 focusing on what matters should be deemed public,
thereby bringing a qualified privilege to their discussion.65
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's parallel decisions, the Florida
60. 376 U.S. at 285-86. The Court noted that the self-censorship effect of libel suits
arises from three factors. First, the possibility of an adverse judgment without criminal
law safeguards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the imposition of large
damage awards without proof of actual loss. Finally, the possibility of other judgments
arising from the same publications. Id. at 277-78.
61. Actual malice was created as the standard of fault to govern constitutionally protected defamatory falsehoods. The Court defined actual malice as "knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80. The
term "reckless disregard" was refined in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), where
the Court explained that reckless disregard did not refer to whether a reasonable man
would have published the article without further investigation. Instead, the focus was
whether the particular defendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication." 390 U.S. at 731. The Court in New York Times also mandated "convincing
clarity" as the standard of proof required, as opposed to the tort law standard of preponderance of the evidence. 376 U.S. at 285-86. A third concept of de novo appellate review
was sanctioned and utilized by the Court for constitutionally protected defamatory statements. 376 U.S. at 285-92.
62. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (defamed private figures
involved in matters of public concern or interest must prove actual malice); Curtis Publ.
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (actual malice standard applies to public figures); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (actual malice standard applied to privacy suit involving
matter of public interest). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (actual
malice standard not mandated for private figures). See generally Hill, Defamation and
Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("if there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech and not enforced
silence, only an emergency can justify repression.").
64. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television
Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
65. See note 40 supra.
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courts made this determination. However, the two courts were dealing with
different kinds of qualified privileges. Because the Florida case law was
developed before New York Times and its promulgation of an actual malice
standard of fault, the Florida courts were treating a qualified privilege that
was protected by the requirement of express malice, the common law standard
of fault.60 Nonetheless, this distinction does not vitiate the precedental significance of Florida's early case law development. The similar contours of the
standards adopted by the Florida courts and the United States Supreme
Court suggests that the limits of the media's qualified privilege did not depend
on the differing focuses of express and actual malice 6 7 Additionally, the
Florida supreme court relied on the precedent established in these early
decisions when it subsequently adopted an actual malice standard for matters
of public interest.68
The greatest latitude for press coverage and public exposure was extended
to publications regarding the conduct of public officials. The Florida supreme
court reasoned that a candidate for public office places his character in issue
to the extent it may affect his qualifications for office.69 Thus, express malice
must be proven to impose liability for defamatory publications regarding the
public official's character.70 The United States Supreme Court subsequently
declared that publications about the character or qualifications of a public
official or candidate were relevant to his fitness for office, and consequently
within the first amendment's qualified protection. 71 Although the realm of
public interest in the qualifications and conduct of public officials and candidates is necessarily broad, the courts did not preclude the possibility that a
private sphere still existed for such persons.7 2
A qualified privilege was also extended to published material about
66. See note 29 supra.
67. See note 40 supra.
68. See Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973),
relying on Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) and Abram
v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956).
69. State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 90 Fla. 1071, 1074, 114 So. 856, 857 (1927). A newspaper published an article stating that a candidate for city commission had committed
forgery and duplication. Reversing the criminal libel conviction, the Florida supreme court
stated that the publisher had a qualified privilege to publish the article since it related to
the public's welfare. Id.
70. Id. In White v. Fletcher, 90 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1956) the Florida supreme court extended
this qualified privilege to statements about anyone who seeks public patronage, reasoning
that persons who seek public employment submit themselves to the scrutiny of those whose
patronage they seek. Thus, these public figures are subject to fair comment. Id. at 131.
71. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971). A charge of criminal conduct
against a public official or candidate was held relevant to his fitness for office no matter how
remote in time or place. Id. at 277. Accord, Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295,
300-01 (1971).
72. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 n.16 (1971) (there are aspects of a
public official's life that are not of public concern); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
275 (1971) (open issue as to whether there remain aspects of a public official's life that are not
afforded first amendment protection); see State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 90 Fla. 1071, 1075, 114
So. 856, 858 (1927) (the qualified privilege does not embrace the right to attack the private
character of public men).
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persons who voluntarily inject themselves into an issue of public interest,
that is, public figures.7 3 In 1956, the Florida supreme court in Abram v.
Odham- affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a complaint against a newspaper that published a political candidate's defamatory remarks about the
plaintiff and his pre-election survey. The court concluded that the newspaper's qualified privilege to publish matters of public interest was buttressed
by plaintiff's voluntary entry into a matter of public concern.75 The Abram
analysis closely resembles the 1967 United States Supreme Court decision in
Associated Press v. Walker.76 A retired Army general was accused in a magazine publication of leading a violent racial riot at the University of Mississippi.
The Court determined the public's interest in the circulation of the material
involved and the plaintiff's purposeful thrusting of himself into an important
public controversy,7 7 justified classifying the plaintiff as a public figure. He
8
was therefore required to prove actual malice.7
However, the two most significant cases defining the limits of the qualified
privilege to publish matters of public interest arose not from libel suits but
from privacy actions. The issue before the courts concerned whether the
media's qualified privilege extended to actors in newsworthy events who
desired anonymity. Both the Florida and United States Supreme Courts circumscribed the realm of privacy for even the involuntary actor.
In Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co.- the plaintiff, a bystander,
was portrayed in a film telecast of a gambling raid at a cigar store as he was
being questioned by police investigators. Speaking to the plaintiff's privacy
interests, the Florida supreme court concluded that one "emerges from his
seclusion" by being present at the occurrence of an event of public interest. 8o
The court extended a qualified privilege to the media's use of the name or

73. Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 1956).
74. 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956).
75. Id. at 336. The newspaper's co-defendant was the candidate who had made the
defamatory comments. Although the Florida supreme court found there was insufficient
evidence of malice on the part of the newspaper, the court remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 336, 338.
76. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
77. Id. at 154-55. The companion case of Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts involved a magazine's accusation that the plaintiff, a well-known football coach, had fixed a football game
at the University of Georgia. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had attained the status
of a public figure by virtue of his position. Id. at 155. Thus two categories of public figures
were delineated, both of which would be held to a standard of actual malice.
78. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, professed that the standard of fault should
be "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. Only
a punitive damage recovery should be subject to an actual malice standard. Id. at 161. However, a majority of the Court joined Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion mandating
an actual malice standard of fault for public figures. Id. at 166. (Joined by Black, Douglas,
Brennan and White, JJ.). The Chief Justice reasoned that the standard proposed by Justice
Harlan was an inadequate guide for a jury of laymen and failed to afford speech first
amendment protection. Id. at 163.
79. 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
80. Id. at 36.
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photograph of a person who had become an actor in a newsworthy event
regardless of the involuntary nature of his actor role."'
Both the holding and analysis in Jacova are analogous to the subsequent
United States Supreme Court decision in Time, Inc. v.Hill. 2 Plaintiff brought
an action under a state privacy statute when a magazine reported that a
current play accurately portrayed the experiences of his family when they
were held captive in their home by escaped convicts. The Court concluded
that in our society exposure of one's self to others in varying degrees is an
inevitable aspect of life.8 3 Because the article involved a matter of public

concern, the Court determined that the privacy interest of the individual
must yield to the primary value that society places on the freedom of the
press.8 4 Therefore, an actual malice standard of fault was deemed to apply.85
Stage Three: Adopting an Actual Malice Standard
ForMattersof Public Concern
The firmly established media privilege that included actors who desired
anonymity, coupled with both the state and federal courts' consistent focus
on matters of public concern or interest,86 triggered the culminating step. At
both levels the actual malice standard was applied to defamation suits
brought by private individuals involved in matters of public interest or
concern. Similar to the privilege conferred in the privacy cases, this qualified
privilege did not focus on the status of the defamed party, but rather on the
subject matter of the communication.r The courts recognized that the public's
interest did not depend solely on the plaintiff's notoriety or lack thereof, but
instead on the subject matter of the publication, 8 and concluded that official
recognition should be given to this reality.
81. Id. at 37. See also Stafford v. Hayes, 327 So. 2d 871, (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976) (relying
on Jacova, the court recognized the media's qualified privilege to televise plaintiff's picture
in conjunction with a report on the evacuation of a capitol building due to a bomb threat).
82. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
83. Id,at 388.
84. Id. The Court stated its holding was limited to the facts and the opportunity
to rebut might be germane if this were a libel suit. Id. at 391. But see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (actual malice standard extended to private defamation suits
involving matters of public interest). See generally Wright, Defamation, Privacy and the
Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEx. L. REv. 630

(1968) (proposing factors to be considered in the balance of society's "right to know" against
the protection of the individual's privacy).
85. 385 U.S. at 390. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, rejected a negligence
standard because its elusive quality would intolerably burden the press with deciding how
a jury would assess the reasonableness of the publisher's verification of references to a name
or picture. Id. at 389. Furthermore, a negligence standard would create the potential danger
of penalizing even legitimate utterances due to the lack of guidance it affords. Id.
86. See note 39 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
88. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is
in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXHI

In 1970, the Florida supreme court in Gibson v. Maloney-9 promulgated
the qualified privilege of "fair comment on a public matter." 90 The plaintiff
in Gibson acquired a small weekly newspaper and immediately began an
editorial campaign against the Alfred I. duPont estate and its affiliates. In
an address to a business club, the president of one of the estate's affiliated
companies accused the plaintiff of causing his business to decrease and of
hindering the community's growth. Although the court found the plaintiff
a public figure due to his publishing activities,91 the court's inquiry went
further. Relying on Jacova and New York Times, the court focused on its
prior conclusion in Jacova that one emerges from his seclusion by becoming
an actor in an event of public interest.92 The Jacova precedent, coupled with
New York Times' primary commitment to robust debate on public issues, 93
led the court to conclude that an actual malice standard should protect the
94
qualified privilege to comment on public matters.
Subsequently, a Florida district court of appeal applied the qualified
privilege developed in Gibson to media defendants.9 5 Utilizing reasoning
similar to that in Gibson, many lower federal courts also adopted a constitutional privilege for publications about private individuals involved in matters
of public interest.96 In a series of three decisions, the Fifth Circuit Court of
and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
89. 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973).
90. 231 So. 2d at 826.
91. Id. at 824. The court did not refer to any of the United States Supreme Court
decisions regarding the applicability of an actual malice standard for public figures such as
Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The only United States Supreme Court decision cited by the majority was New York Times. Instead, the court relied on its prior
conclusion in Abram. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
92. 231 So. 2d at 825. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
93. 231 So. 2d at 825-26. The court quoted extensively from the sections of New York
Times that dealt with the first amendment freedom of expression upon public questions.
Id.
94. Id. at 826. The conclusion that Gibson was not merely a public figure case is
buttressed by the analysis of the First District Court of Appeal in Gibson v. Maloney, 263
So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). On remand from the
Florida supreme court, the circuit court entered a jury verdict for the plaintiff. In reversing,
the district court relied on the Florida supreme court's former disposition in Gibson and
on the intervening decision of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 263
So. 2d at 635. Instead of determining whether or not the plaintiff was a public figure, the
court concluded that the case fell within the ambit of the constitutional protection of
matters of public interest or concern. Id. at 635-38.
95. In Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 235 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 240 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1970), a television station aired editorials about the
plaintiff's testimony before the city commission. Relying on Gibson and New York Times,
the court concluded that whether the plaintiff was a public official, a public figure, involved in a matter of public interest or whether his testimony was a matter of public
interest, an actual malice standard applied. 235 So. 2d at 761. The court also relied on three
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, decided prior to Rosenbloom. Id. See note 97 infra.
96. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969) (police raid
for obscene books), aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Wasserman v. Time. Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C.
Cir.) (lawyer eating lunch with reputed gangsters), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970); United
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968)
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Appeals concluded that New York Times and its progeny supported the extension of an actual malice standard of fault to matters of public interest,
97
irrespective of the plaintiff's status.
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court responded to these lower court
developments in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, IncY s Rosenbloom involved a
(pharmaceutical and laboratory testing); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D.
I1. 1970) (prosecution of policeman), aff'd, 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323
(1974); DeSalvo v. Twentieth Century-Fox Films Corp., 300 F. Supp. 742 (D. Mass. 1969)
(notorious individual crime); Arizona Biochem. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.
N.Y. 1969) (garbage pickups); Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. N.Y. 1967)
(hospital for the criminally insane). Several commentators also predicted that the Court
would not permit a public-private figure distinction when matters of public interest were
involved. See, e.g., Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle:A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 371, 378-79 (1970) (predicting that the
Supreme Court will extend an actual malice standard to matters of public concern); Note,
Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 56 IowA L. REv. 393, 399-400 (1970) (hypothesizing that the Court will extend the
New York Times rule to matters of public concern in light of the circuit courts of appeals
decisions); Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for good-Faith Defamatory Error,
75 YALE LJ. 642, 644-45 (1966) (suggesting that the Court will redefine the public official
category in order to protect the private lives of such persons by focusing on the relevancy
of the subject matter of the publication).
97. In Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969),
the court concluded that a constitutional privilege extends to individuals not associated
with the government "if those individuals are involved in matters of important public
concern." Id. at 573. The court relied on the Supreme Court's application of an actual
malice standard in Hill, noting that the case involved a matter of great public concern. Id.
Furthermore, the court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in United Medical
Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), that
New York Times had not marked the "outer limit," but rather was open to further definition.
406 F.2d at 573. Consequently, the court remanded with instructions for summary judgment
for the magazine which had mentioned the plaintiff's name in an article about organzied
crime in the Bahamas. Id.
Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970), involved a magazine
article about the Masters Golf Tournament, and in particular the declining condition of
plaintiff's hotel. Affirming the lower court's summary judgment for the magazine, the court
stated that although the plaintiff in McLaney resembled a public figure, absent proof of
actual malice, publication of matters of public interest are constitutionally protected. Id. at
861. The court also noted that since New York Times was announced the Supreme Court
continued to emphasize that the first amendment secures freedom of expression on public
issues. Id.
In Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970), the defendant magazine published
a picture of seven men seated in a restaurant and referred to the gathering as a meeting of
the "top Cosa Nostra hoodlums." Actually, two of the men pictured were attorneys representing the alleged "hoodlums." rd. at 220. The court concluded that even if the plaintiff
attorney was not a public figure, an actual malice standard of fault applied because the
article involved a matter of public interest. Id. at 221.
98. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Court noted that numerous lower courts had already recognized a constitutional privilege for matters of public interest. Id. at 46 n.14. The plurality
stressed that the common element in all of these cases was a "defamatory falsehood in the
report of an event of 'public or general interest.'" Id. at 30-31, (Brennan, J.). Parallel to the
Florida supreme court's reliance in Gibson on the Jacova privacy case, the Court placed
strong reliance on its prior decision in Iill, Id. at 47-48. See text accompanying note 92
supra.
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libel suit against a radio station arising from its defamatory statements about
a police raid of plaintiff's obscene books.09 The Court determined that because
a matter of public or general interest was involved, the statements were
constitutionally protected and thus governed by an actual malice standard
of fault.100
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, 1°1 elucidated the impropriety of
a public-private figure distinction, observing four major defects in predicating
a constitutional privilege on such a distinction. First, the public's interest in
the event reported does not depend on the voluntariness of the actor's involvement, nor on his prior notoriety or anonymity. The public's primary
interest is in the event itself.10 2 Second, public figures and public officials
10 3
deserve as much protection of their reputations as do private individuals.
99. Plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested on charges of selling obscene
material, and his books and magazines were seized. The police captain phoned the radio
station and informed it of the raid and arrest. Petitioner sued the radio station for failing
to report that the 3,000 items seized were only allegedly obscene. In its radio coverage of the
court proceeding in which petitioner sought injunctive relief against police interference
with his business, the newscasts also referred to the "smut literature racket" and "girlie-book
peddlers." 403 U.S. at 34. The Third Circuit reversed a judgment against the radio station,
holding that the New York Times privilege applied because the broadcast involved a matter
of public concern. 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
100. 403 U.S. at 52. Justice Brennan rejected a negligence standard because a jury's determination of reasonable care would not provide adequate breathing space for the freedoms
of speech and press. Id. at 50. Justice Brennan also reiterated the concerns he had expressed
in Hill about the elusiveness of a negligence standard. Id. See note 85 supra. A preponderance
of the evidence standard was also rejected because of the concern that an erroneous verdict
in a libel case was "most serious" since it "would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship." 403 U.S. at 50. The Court adopted the standard of convincing clarity, which previously had applied to actual malice. Id. 101.
Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Black.
Justice Black concurred separately, reiterating his view that the first amendments was intended
to give the press an absolute privilege from libel judgments. 1d. at 57. Justice Douglas did
not participate in the decision; however, he had consistently aligned himself with Justice
Black's belief that the first amendment bars all libel actions against the media. See Curtis
Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401-02 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., joined
by Douglas, J., concurring); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 823, 856-57 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice White concurred in judgment, but concluded that the case
should be decided on the more narrow principle that New York Tones gave the media a
qualified privilege to report upon the official actions of public servants. 408 U.S. at 60-62.
The three dissenters were Justices Harlan, Marshall and Stewart. Justice Harlan stated
that a simple negligence standard should apply to private individuals because of their limited
access to rebuttals and their involuntary role as public personalities. Id. at 68-71. Justice
Harlan's ultimate conclusion was that the states should define the applicable standard of
care in private libel actions "so long as they do not impose liability without fault." Id. at
64. In addition, compensatory damages should be predicated on a showing of actual injury,
and punitive damages should be awarded only if actual malice is proven. Id. Justice Harlan's
reasonable care standard has been rejected by the majority in Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 166 (1967), see note 78 supra, but it parallels Justice Powell's majority opinion
in Gertz. See notes 118-127 and accompanying text, infra.
102. Id. at 43. See note 88 supra.
103. 403 U.S. at 45-46. "The New York Times standard was applied to libel of a
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Additionally, the ability to rebut defamatory falsehoods successfully is not
conditioned on the individual's status, but rather on the unpredictable
continuing interest of the media and the public.104 Finally, predicating a
constitutional privilege on the voluntariness of one's exposure does not
survive constitutional scrutiny because everyone is necessarily a public person
to some degree.105 Moreover, such a distinction would produce anomalous
results. It would repress discussion on matters of public concern simply because
a private citizen happened to be involved, while constitutionally stimulating
discussion on the aspects of lives of public figures that are not matters of
public concern. 08
The extensions in Gibson and Rosenbloom solidified a constitutional
privilege that focused on the essence of the first amendment, the right to
receive information on issues that affect daily life. 7 Moreover, in balancing a
free press against the vindication interests of the defamed individual, the
first amendment rests on one side of the balance with no countervailing
constitutional provision on the other. At least seventeen states, including
Florida, and several federal appellate courts embraced and applied the
Rosenbloom standard.05
In Firestone v. Time, Inc.1- the Florida supreme court concurred that
publications about matters of public concern should be constitutionally
public official or public figure to give effect to the amendment's function to encourage
ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life." Id.
104. Id. at 46. The Court noted that a rebuttal seldom overrides the impact of the
original statement for either a public or private individual. Furthermore, the argument
that public officials and public figures have greater access to the channels of effective
counter-criticism is considerably weakened when those public officials or public figures hold
minor positions or have been terminated. Id. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85
(1966) (former supervisor of a county owned ski-resort was held to be a public official because he was a government employee who appeared to the public to have control over
government affairs).
105. 403 U.S. at 48. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
106. Id. The Court expressly left open the issue of what standard of fault should apply
to publications not within the area of public or general interest, noting that there is a
private sphere to both the notorious and anonymous individual's life. Id. at 44 n.12, 48.
107. Contra, Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L.REv. 199, 211 (1976). Justice Brennan explained that to preserve the first amendment guarantees, discussion "must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period." 403 U.S. at 41 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940)). See generally Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation:New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 Rurr.-CAm. L. REv. 471, 474-80 (1975) (explaining the merits of the Rosenbloom holding). See also Anderson, Libel Law Today, 14 TRIM
19, 19 (May 1978) (Rosenbloom applied the Time rule to its logical end); Kalven, supra note
57, at 208 (the core of the first amendment is the protection of speech, without which we
could not function).
108. For a comprehensive list of the decisions that applied the Rosenbloom holding prior
to Gertz, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 377 n.10 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
109. 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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protected regardless of whether they relate to prominent or obscure
individuals.11 The Florida supreme court in Firestone sought to refine
Rosenbloom by developing a workable test for determining when an
individual's activities do not involve a matter of public concern, so that a
a publication about them is not constitutionally protected.", A test was
promulgated that focused on whether a logical relationship existed between
the subject matter reported and genuine public concern." 2 Whether this relationship existed was held to be a question of law, allowing a publisher to
avoid "gambling" on a jury's subsequent judgment of reasonableness., 3 Firestone involved in a libel action by the divorced wife of a wealthy tire industrialist based on an erroneous magazine report which stated that the divorce
was granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery."1 4 The long
divorce trial elicited more than eighty-five articles in local newspapers, and
the wife held several press conferences during the pendency of the proceeding. Nontheless, the Florida supreme court concluded that a logical relationship did not exist between the marital difficulties of the appellant and real
concern of the public." 5 Prurient curiosity, the only possible basis for public
concern, was determined to be an improper predicate upon which to extend
protection."x1
The effect of Gibson and Firestone was the establishment in Florida of
an actual malice standard for defamation suits brought by private individuals
involved in matters of public concern." 7 Gibson's promulgation of this standard
110. 271 So. 2d at 749.
111. See note 106supra.
112. 271 So. 2d at 751. The court explained that the test for public figures and matters
of public concern is "whether there is a logical relationship between the reported activities
of the prominent person, or between the subject matter of the conduct, occasion or event
reported or recorded, and the real concern of the public." Id. (emphasis by the court).
113. Id. "[R]easonable men cannot differ on what is logical although logical men may
differ on what is reasonable." Id.
114. The divorce decree stated that her husband had counterclaimed on the grounds of
extreme cruelty and adultery, and the extramarital escapades of appellant would have made
"Dr. Frued's hair curl." The decree however was granted on the grounds of lack of domestication. Firestone v. Firestone, 249 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971). On appeal, the Florida
supreme court held that lack of domestication was not grounds for divorce in Florida, but
sustained the divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d
223, 225 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam).
115. 271 So. 2d at 752. The court hypothesized that if one of the divorcing parties was
a marriage counselor, then a logical relationship would have existed between the divorce
action and the concern of the public whose patronage is sought. Id.
116. Id. The court explained that the focus should be on the public's real concern,
rather than merely on the public's interest, in the matter involved. It concluded that
focusing on concern more appropriately followed the rationale of the constitutional protection extended in Rosenbloom. Id.
117. Relying on Firestone and Rosenbloom, the Third District Court on Appeal applied
a constitutional privilege to matters of public concern in Nigro v. Miami Herald Publ. Co.,
262 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1972). The libel suit
was based on newspaper articles about a group of persons who flew to Miami and were
served with federal grand jury subpoenas at the airport. The articles described the group
as "Cosa Nostra members and their associates" and as "henchmen of midwestern Mafia
leaders." The plaintiffs claimed they had come to Miami for a golfing weekend and were
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prior to the mandate of Rosenbloom demonstrates Florida's voluntary commitment to the dissemination of information on public matters. The "logical relationship" test developed in Firestone facilities such dissemination while
concurrently protecting the individual's private sphere.
A Retreat by the United States Supreme Court
Three years after Rosenbloom, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.1 8 was decided
by the United States Supreme Court. A narrow majority of the Court held
that the states were no longer compelled to f6l1ow Rosenbloom.- 9 The Court
did not decide whether a standard less than actual malice was required for
publications about private individuals involved in matters of public interest.
Instead, the Court permitted each state to determine its own standard of
fault for libel actions brought by private individuals. The primary guideline
furnished to the states was that liability could not be imposed without
fault.eo
Premised on the caveat that the new open standard would not promote
justice in every case,- the Court proceeded to rationalize its distinction benot involved in criminal activities. Affirming the lower court's summary judgment for the
newspaper, the court concluded that the control of organized crime was an issue of public
concern. Id. at 699-700.
118. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). An attorney had been hired by a family whose son had
been killed by a policeman to represent them in civil litigation against the policeman. An
article published by the defendant magazine stated the trial was part of a national conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies in order to create a Communist dictatorship and portrayed the attorney as a "Communist-fronter" and a "Leninist." No effort was
made to verify or substantiate these charges, all of which contained serious inaccuracies.
Furthermore, the petitioner had not taken part in the criminal trial; he had only attended
the coroner's inquest and initiated civil action. The district court reversed the lower court's
jury verdict for the attorney and entered a j.n.o.v. on the anticipated reasoning of Rosenbloom.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 999-1000 (N.D. Ili. 1970), aff'd, 471 F.2d 801
(7th Cir. 1972).
119. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's opinion. In a
separate concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, who had joined the plurality in Rosenbloom,
stated he would have adhered to his prior view, but he believed that a definitive ruling
was essential and his vote was needed to create a majority. Nevertheless, he did profess
that Rosenbloom was "logical and inevitable." Id. at 354. See also Frakt, supra note 107, at
472 (commenting on the reluctant concurrence of Justice Blackmun).
Gertz"retreat from the views expressed by the Court in New York Times through Rosenbloom has been explained by the change from the Warren to the Burger Court. See
Anderson, supra note 107, at 19. Professor Anderson explained that the Burger Court has
focused on the individual's interest in reputation, rather than on the dangers of selfcensorship which concerned the Warren Court. Id.
120. 418 U.S. at 347.
121. Id. at 844. The Court premised its opinion on three caveats. First, the broad rules
stated by the Court do not encompass all the considerations involved, and thus they will
not necessarily be ideal when applied to each particular fact situation. Id. Second, although
rebuttal seldom alleviates the harm caused by a defamatory statement, that does not make
the self-help remedy irrelevant to the Court's inquiry. Id. at 844 n.9. Third, even if the
private-public figure distinction is not appropriate in every case, the media should be
able to act on the assumption that public figures voluntarily accept the risk of defamation.
Id. at 345.
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tween private and public figures. The self-help remedy of rebuttal was deemed
to be available exclusively to public figures, so that private individuals are
more vulnerable to injury. 1 22 The distinction was also based on the conclusion
that public officials and public figures "invite attention and comment" by
becoming involved in public controversies.123 Exposure by the media as a
consequence of such voluntary involvement was determined to justify the
burden of proving actual malice. 1 24 Rejection of the Rosenbloom focus on
whether matters were of public concern, was premised on the determination
that Rosenbloom forced judges to decide on an ad hoc basis.125 The Court
nevertheless cautioned that recovery of punitive damages would require a
showing of at least actual malice.26 The state's interest in compensating
individuals for injury to reputation was held to extend no further than
12
compensation for actual injuries.

7

122. Id. at 344. The Court conceded that a rebuttal seldom alleviates the injury of a
defamatory statement. Id. at 344 n.9. See note 103 and accompanying text, supbra.
123. 418 U.S. at 344-45. Public figures were defined in two ways: as persons who occupy
positions of pervasive power and influence; and as those who inject themselves into a particular public issue in an effort to influence its outcome. Both types of public figures
"assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society." Id. at 345. Gertz has been
criticized for failing to accomplish its desired avoidance of the public interest issue, since
it bases public figure status on the person's involvement in matters of public interest. See
Frakt, supra note 107, at 486. It is also perceived as punishing those who participate in
public affairs, while rewarding those who engage in mundane pursuits. Id. at 487. The decision is further faulted for its failure to extend any protection to the private lives of
public figures. Id. See note 106 supra.
124. 418 U.S. at 345. The Court noted that one could become an "involuntary public
figure," but did not explain when such a label would apply. See id.
125. Id. at 346. The courts seem to have difficulty in determining whether a particular
plaintiff is a public figure. The circuit court in Gertz doubted the district court's determination that Gertz was a public figure, 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972), and the Supreme Court
concluded that Gertz was not a public figure, 418 U.S. at 352. A similar disagreement about
the public figure determination occurred in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). The
majority concluded that the respondent was not a public figure, although her notoriety was
so great that she subscribed to a press-clipping service. Id. at 453-54. Justice Marshall's
strong dissent stated that she was undoubtedly a public figure. Id. at 484-88. See also Frakt,
supra note 107, at 487 (determining when an individual is a public figure "for a limited
range of issues" will necessarily entail ad hoc determinations of what is and what is not a
public issue). See note 189 infra.
126. 418 U.S. at 348-49. Subsequent to Gertz several states have barred punitive damage
awards in defamation suits. See, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849,
860, 330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (1975) (no punitive damages in any defamation action); Wheeler
v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 110, 593 P.2d 777, 789 (1979) (common law defamation suits limited
to compensatory damages); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 439, 447, 546 P.2d 81,
86 (1976) (private plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages in defamation suits). Cf. FLA.
STAT. §770.02 (1979) (recovery limited to actual damages in any media defamation suit if
originally published with good motives and subsequently retracted).
127. 418 U.S. at 348-49. The Court left the task of defining "actual injury" to the
lower courts, but determined that it would not be limited to pecuniary loss. Actual damages
could include "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 349-50. The Court stressed its disapproval of
the common law presumption of damages because it allowed substantial awards without
proof of damage to reputation. Id. at 349. Nonetheless, the Court'has subsequently recognized
a cause of action in libel even though the complaint did not charge damage to reputation.
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The Florida supreme court and the Unitdd States Supreme Court positions
diverged after Gertz. Heretofore, the two courts had paralleled each other in
analyses and holdings. 12 However, no pre-Gertz or post-Gertz Florida supreme
court decisions have dislodged Florida from the Gibson and Firestone
129
philosophy.
Subsequent to Gertz, three Florida district courts of appeal have summarily
concluded that Gertz established a dual standard for defamation suits based
upon the plaintiff's status. 3 o Two of the courts, while stating this presumption,
failed to express what standard of fault now applies to libel suits brought by
private individuals.' 2 ' The other court applied a negligence standard. 32 However, the court's decision to use this standard was based on an erroneous
interpretation of a Florida supreme court decision that had been reversed by
the United States Supreme Court precisely because it failed to enunciate a
standard of fault l su
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976). Justice Brennan's dissent in Gertz predicted

the Court's liberal conceptualization of "actual damages" would ultimately be used by juries
to punish unpopular expressions. 418 U.S. at 367.

128. See note 40 supra.
129. After Gertz the Florida supreme court again dealt with the Firestone case in Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974) (per curiam). Firestone II gave the court an

opportunity to review its prior acceptance and application of Rosenbloom in Firestone 1,
271 So. 2d at 748-52. See notes 109-116 and accompanying text, supra. However, the court
quoted from its previous conclusion that the divorce action was not a matter of public
concern; thus the publication was not constitutionally protected. 305 So. 2d at 175. The
only reference to the intervening .Gertz decision was to its definition of actual injury, which
was cited to support the trial court's instructions on actual damages. See 4d. at 176. The
court concluded that the publication was actionable per se because it falsely accused a
woman of adultery. Id. at 175. Reversing the lower court's judgment for the magazine

publisher, the Florida supreme court made references to three different standards of fault,
but did not indicate which one it was applying. Id. at 177-78. The court's failure to specify
which standard of fault it was utilizing resulted in the United States Supreme Court vacating
and remanding the Florida supreme court decision. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464.

The United States Supreme Court did, however, uphold the Florida supreme court's finding
that the divorce action was not a matter of public concern. Id. at 453-55. Thus it appears that

even if Firestone II indicates a tendency for Florida to adopt a negligence standard, this
tendency would only apply to defamation suits not involving a matter of public concern.
An appeal is presently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal in which a

publisher has expressly asked the court to determine what standard of fault applies to private
individuals involved in matters of public concern. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Ane, No. 791463 (Fla. 3d D.C.A., filed Dec. 20, 1979) (oral argument presented July 1, 1980).
130. Karp v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978) (per curiam);
Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th D.CA.) (per curiam) (dictum), cert denied,
358 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974).
131. Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1974).
132. Karp v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 359 So. 2d 580, 581 n.l (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).
133. The trial and district courts relied on the Florida supreme court's decision in Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). A second reason
why the lower courts' reliance on Firestone 11 was erroneous is that Firestone did not involve
a matter of public concern. Therefore, even if a standard of fault had been determined in
that decision, the standard may not have been applicable in Karp. Karp involved a newspaper article erroneously stating that the plaintiff was facing deportation after being
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Therefore, Florida is without a definitive post-Gertz decision to establish
what, if any, effect Gertz has had on Florida case law. The preceding analysis
demonstrates Florida's pre-Gertz, voluntarily promulgated, qualified media
privilege for matters of public concern. The following section juxtaposes
Florida's historical posture with that of the states that have adopted a postGertz standard in an effort to identify Florida's position.
PROPosED RESOLUTIONS FOR A PosT-GERT-z FLORIDA

The doctrine announced in Gertz summoned the states to review two
aspects of their defamation laws: damages and fault."3 The actionable per se
common law concept that presumed both general damages and malice is now
foreclosed.1 5 Although the Gertz Court delineated the boundaries of the damage issue by defining "actual injury,"' 136 it left to the individual states the task
of determining what standard of fault to apply to defamation suits brought
37
by private plaintiffs.
Unlike Florida, many states have now enunciated their post-Gertz stances.
These states have adopted several divergent standards of fault, ranging from
simple negligence to actual malice. 3 s The considerations and rationales applied
charged by immigration officials with illegal entry into the country. Actually, no charge
had been filed, but an investigation was pending. Illegal entry may be determined to involve
a matter of public concern. Thus, the precedential value of this district court decision is
tenuous both because of its erroneous reliance on Firestone and because the parties agreed
to a negligence standard without presenting appellate arguments on the issue.
134. The applicability of Gertz to non-media defendants is unclear. Although Gertz
was phrased in terms of the media, 418 U.S. at 325, 347, 350, the Court has subsequently
noted that this issue is unclear. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 n.16 (1979). A
few states have applied the Gertz principles to non-media defendants. See, e.g., Artic Co.
v. London Times Mirror, 4 Media L. Rep. 1947, 1950 (E.D. Va. 1978); Rogozinski v. Airstream By Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 146, 377 A.2d 807, 814 (1977). But see Rowe v. Metz,
195 Colo. 424, 426, 579 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Colo. 1978); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765,
767-68, 218 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1975); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 506, 228
N.W.2d 737, 748 (1975).
135. See note 10 supra and notes 120 & 127 and accompanying text, supra.
136. The Court's broad definition of "actual injury" has resulted in a lenient application of the damage issue in private person defamation suits. See note 127 supra.
137. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
138. See, e.g., Ryder v. Time, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. 1170 (D.D.C. 1977) (actual malice
standard for matter of public or general concern); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114
Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977) (simple negligence for private plaintiffs); Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 118 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975) (modified actual malice standard for
matters of public interest), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.
2d
184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975) (simple negligence for private plaintiffs defamed by media defendants); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publ., Inc., 162 Ind. App.
671, 321 N.E. 580 (1975) (actual malice standard for matters of public concern), cert denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Publ. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975) (journalistic
negligence for private plaintiffs); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688
(1976) (negligence standard for all private person defamation suits against media and nonmedia defendants); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693
(1978) (per curiam) (actual malice standard for matters of public interest); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 596 (1975) (gross irresponsibility
standard for matters of legitimate public concern); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86
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by the states choosing an actual malice standard for publications about
matters of public concern comports with the philosophy historically advocated by Florida law. A post-Gertz ratification of the actual malice standard
for matters of public concern will serve simply to re-establish Florida's preRosenbloom13 and pre-Gertz'40 standard.
The Prospectsof an Actual Malice Standard
of Faultfor Matters of Public Concern
In 1975, Indiana became the first state to reconcile Gertz with the qualified
privilege announced in New York Times and Rosenbloom, adopting an actual
malice standard of fault for publications involving matters of public interest.'-'
The Indiana appellate court, in Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwestern Publishing, Inc.,' 2 enunciated three dominant reasons for
employing the actual malice standard. Initially, the court focused on its
state constitution which provided for the right to publish on any subject
whatsoever, 43 and on New York Times' and its progeny's commitment to
robust debate on public issues.'" This strong state and federal policy was
deemed to mandate a standard of fault that accorded the communications
media latitude for error while minimizing self-censorship on controversial
m 45
An actual malice standard was determined to be appropriate
public issues.
to protect the fundamental freedom of expression on public issues.46
Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (simple negligence standard). See generally Collins, iThe
Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 2A CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 306
(1978).
139. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). See
notes 89-94 and accompanying text, supra.
140. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds per
curiam, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See notes 109-116 and accompanying text, supra.
141. Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning v. Northwestern Publ., Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671,
679, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
142. Id. at 671, 321 N.E.2d at 580. The newspaper published articles concerning an
electrical home fire which resulted in the death of two children. The article revealed the
plaintiff had installed a furnace in the home three weeks before the fire, no permit was
obtained before the installation, and a fire official stated the furnace might have caused the
fire. The district court sustained the trial court's summary judgment for the newspaper.
The post-Gertz decisions adopting a fault standard do not focus on the particular facts
of the cases. Rather, the standard chosen was merely summarily applied to the facts.
143. Id. at 678 & n.4, 321 N.E.2d at 585-86 & n.4. Indiana's constitution provides:. "No
law shall be passed, restraining free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the
right to speak, write or print, freely on any subject whatsoever; but for the abuse of that
right, every person shall be responsible." IND. CoNST. art. I, §9.
144. Id. at 678-80, 321 N-E.2d at 586-87.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 678-85, 321 N.E.2d at 586-89. The uncertainty and vagueness of a negligence
standard in the hands of the jury was determined to promote self-censorship by causing
publishers to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." Id. at 683, 321 N.E.2d at 588, quoting
from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. f613, 526 (1958). See also Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspaper,
Inc., 372 N.E.2d. 1211, 1218 n.3 (Ind. App. 1978) (a different standard might have been
adopted for private plaintiffs if Aafco had not been denied transfer by the Indiana supreme
court and denied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court).
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Second, the Indiana court noted the sizeable body of federal case law
that had developed on the issue of distinguishing matters of public interest.147
The court concluded that these precedents provided sufficient guidance -for
the judiciary and the media to determine which matters were appropriate
for public comment. Therefore, the determination of which publications were
protected by an actual malice standard would not invoke ad hoc judgments.1 5
Finally, the court in Aafco Heating adopted a subject matter focus due
to its concern with the artificiality of and lack of constitutional predicate for
a private-public person dichotomy. The underlying assumption of such a
distinction, that society has a greater interest in protecting the reputation of
the private rather than the public individual, was determined to erode the
primary function of the first amendment. The court viewed the first amendment as an encouragement of commentaries on public issues.149 Society's need
to receive information on matters of public concern was deemed not diluted
by the involvement of a private individual in the matter.150 Therefore, a
subject matter focus in the defamation litigation context was concluded to
be consistent with the first amendment's and public's primary subject matter
concern.
The rationales expressed in Aafco Heating for adopting an actual malice
standard for matters of public interest are congruent with the policies expressed in prior Florida law. As in Indiana, Florida's constitution also protects
the right to publish on any subject. 15- Moreover, Florida need not look to
federal case law to discern a commitment to the discussion of matters of
public concern. Florida's precedents provide a number of decisions which
147. 162 Ind. App. at 686, 321 N.E.2d at 590.
148. Id.
149.

Id. at 680-81, 321 N.E.2d at 587. Access to the media to counter defamatory re-

marks was found to be a hardship encountered equally by private and public figures. The
efficacy of any rebuttal was concluded to be dependent on the public's continuing interest in
the event, rather than on the prominence of the actors. Id. Furthermore, the assumption that
public individuals assume the risk of defamation due to their voluntary placement in the

public's eye, was determined to be an unwarranted basis for distinguishing defamation
suits. All citizens assume the risk of exposure by becoming involved in matters of public

interest. Id. at 683, 321 N.E.2d at 588.
150. Id. at 680, 321 N.E.2d at 587. In determining the application of constitutional protections the focus must be on whether the publication concerns an issue of public interest,

regardless of the individual's notoriety or anonymity. Id. The presence of a private individual
in an event of public interest does not lessen the significance of the event. M. at 682, 821
N.E.2d at 588. Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 408 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (a matter

of public interest does not become less so when a private individual is involved) and Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1972) (matters of public concern should be
constitutionally protected whether notorious or obscure individuals are involved), rev'd on

other grounds per curiam, 805 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) and Taskett
v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 475, 546 P.2d 81, 102 (1976) (Horowitz, J.,
dissenting) (the significance of an event of public interest is not altered by the presence of
a private individual) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 823, 844-45 (1974) (public
figures voluntarily expose themselves to an increased threat of defamation by becoming involved in public controversies).
151. Florida's constitution provides: "Every person may speak, write or publish his
sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." FLA. CONST. art. I, §4.
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have consistently focused on the discussion of matters of public concern
through the promotion of an uninhibited press.152 Ross v. Gore is a succinct
example of the Florida supreme court's recognition of the vital role of a
free press in our society. By extending to the media latitude for occasional
errors and abuse of its privileges, the Florida supreme court evinced a primary
commitment to the uninhibited dissemination of news. 153 Recognition of the
unique role of the media is also apparent in other early Florida decisions
which refused to perpetuate strict liability in media-based defamation actions.
Instead, the Florida courts developed a qualified privilege, requiring the
plaintiff to affirmatively prove malice in cases involving media publications
of public interest events. 154 The Florida supreme court has long and consistently applied a qualified media privilege to matters of public concern. 55
This judicial policy is the most cogent reason for predicting that Gertz will
not alter the security of news dissemination on events that affect the lives of
Florida citizens.
Indiana's additional reliance on the adequacy of federal case law for
discerning matters of public interest illuminates the even greater efficacy of
adopting a subject matter focus in Florida. For more than three decades
the Florida courts have utilized a subject matter focus in conjunction with
the media's qualified privilege. 56 The logical relationship test developed by
the Florida supreme court in Firestone v. Time contributes certainty and
simplicity to the judicial and media task of determining which publications
are protected by an actual malice standard. Concededly, the Firestone test
requires refinement. The test demands that a logical relationship exist between
the event reported and the real concern of the public for a publication to
have a qualified privilege. 57 However, "real concern of the public" has not
been specifically defined, except by analogy to previous cases and hypothetical
situations. 58 Nonetheless, the test lends more guidance to the courts and
the media than merely stating that matters of public concern are protected
by an actual malice standard. Moreover, the Firestone test can be expanded
and refined. A significant benefit of the present test is that the court has
held the logical relationship issue to be a question of law. 15 9 Reserving this
decision for judges, rather than juries, will promote consistency and minimize
decisions based on passion and prejudice. Furthermore, the Florida supreme
court's focus on the public's genuine concern, rather than mere interest, with
the subject matter,5 0 serves to confine this qualified privilege to those
152. See note 39 supra.
153. 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1954). See text accompanying notes 48-50 & 55 supra.
154. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text, supra. The Florida legislature also embraced
this philosophy of according special privileges to the media defendant in a defamation suit
by promulgating civil and criminal statutes that mitigated the financial burden on the
media. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text, supra.
155. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text, supra.
156. See Cooper v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 301, 31 So. 2d 382, 384 (1947).
157. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds per
curiam, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
158. Id. at 749, 752.
159. Id. at 751. See note 113 and accompanying text, supra.
160. Id. at 748, 752.
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publications which enhance the community's knowledge about significant
public events. Utilized in this manner, the public concern focus can limit the
applicability of the actual malice standard.
The Indiana court's recognition of the irrationality of distinguishing
plaintiffs by their societal status has been previously understood and addressed
by the Florida courts. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's rejection
of a public-private individual dichotomy' 61 the Florida supreme court renounced such a distinction in Jacova. Jacova's refusal to base the media's
qualified privilege to report events of public concern on the actor's desired
anonymity162 demonstrates Florida's early recognition that media privileges
should not depend on the participant's status. Later, in Firestone, the Florida
supreme court proclaimed that publications on matters of public concern
should be protected regardless of whether notorious or obscure individuals
happened to be involved.163 Because Florida has developed a qualified media
privilege that focuses on subject matter, the status of the plaintiff has
necessarily received limited attention. This does not imply that the Florida
courts are oblivious to the need to protect an individual's reputation from
defamatory falsehoods. Rather, the subject matter focus indicates that Florida
is concerned with preserving the reputation of both public and private figures,
while also cognizant of the compelling need to secure news dissemination on
public issues. This latter concern has promoted the recognition that the
presence of a private individual in an event of public concern does not
make the event any less significant to the public. The concerns which
originally persuaded Florida to adopt an actual malice standard for matters
of public concern are substantially the same concerns recognized by Indiana
in Aafco Heating.
Only two other states that have adopted an actual malice standard for
matters of public concern have explained their rationales.64 The justifications
offered by these state courts differ from those enunciated by the Indiana
court. Nonetheless, their rationales are also consistent with Florida precedent.
161. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 45-47 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
162. Jacova v. Southern Radio &cTelevision Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1955). See text
accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
163. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d at 749. See also Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d
at 823-24 (relying on Jacova's conclusion that a person emerges from his seclusion and is
subject to depiction by the media when he becomes an actor in a matter of public interest).
164. Virginia has also adopted an actual malice standard for media reports on matters
of public concern. Without explaining why this standard was adopted, the court granted
summary judgment to a magazine publisher who had published an article about the
attorney-client privilege and referred to a lawyer who had the same name as plaintiff. Ryder
v. Time, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. 1170 (D.D.C. 1977). New York developed a hybrid standard
of "gross irresponsibility" for publications reasonably related to matters of legitimate public
concern. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571
(1975). The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed summary judgment for the newspaper
that had erroneously reported information about the arrest of a school teacher on drug
related charges. Id. The court did not explain the precise limits or definition of gross irresponsibility. Nonetheless, it should be noted that New York has carved out a special
standard of fault for media publications about "matters warranting public exposition." Id.
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Colorado adopted an actual malice standard for matters of public concern
based on the conclusion that a media deterred by a negligence standard
1
would print insufficient facts in an effort to avoid libel suits. 65
This insufficiency was determined to be more harmfil to the public than the possibility
of inadequate compensation for the defamed private individual. 166 Correspondingly, in Ross the Florida supreme court determined that inhibiting
the press' function of policing society through analytical criticism must be
avoided to preserve a democracy dependent on the public's receipt of news. 67
Similarly, a Florida appellate court defined matters of public interest as events
where the individual's right to receive damages for an injured reputation
becomes secondary to the public's right to know. 68
Michigan's adoption of an actual malice standard for media reports on
matters of public interest 6 9 was premised on a retrospective analysis of state
case law, which revealed that the qualified privilege was originally extended
to communications in which a mutual subject matter interest existed between
the communicating party and the recipient. 7 The duty to communicate had
to be only of a social or moral character, rather than a legal obligation.'71
Florida's early case law similarly defined a qualified privilege as one in which
there is a correspondence of interest in the subject matter, and privileged

165. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 99, 538 P.2d 450, 457-58 (1975)
(media publication about operators of an antique shop who purchased allegedly stolen
goods), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1976).
166. Id.
167. Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950). See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
168. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). An actual malice standard for matters of public interest encourages press coverage of vital topics that otherwise might be foreclosed by a negligence
standard. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 T.Ex. L. Rxv. 442, 445 (1972). See, e.g.,

Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.) (techniques employed by private investigators),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.
1970) (quality of services rendered in a private business); United Medical Laboratories, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968) (inaccuracies of mail order
clinic lab testing), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 349 F.
Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (racial tensions), vacated, 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1973); Goldman
v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp.. 133 (N.D. Cal 1971) (lifestyles of American teenagers). See also
Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 748-49 (Fla. 1972) (public concern is not limited to
governmental matters but includes activities that encourage general public involvement and
matters relating to the health and comfort of the public).
169. Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978) (per
curiam), involved a newspaper report and editorial about an attorney's allegedly inadequate
representation of an indigent criminal defendant. A subsequent Michigan appellate court
decision focused on a newspaper's negligence in placing a classified advertisement that referred to the appellant in an insulting manner. Pettengill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 88
Mich. App. 587, 590, 278 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1979). However, neither the majority nor dissenting opinions referred to Peisner, nor did the court assess whether the advertisement involved
a matter of public interest. Id.
170. Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 161, 266 N.W.2d 699, 699 (1978)
(per curiam), quoting Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 66 Mich. 166, 170, 33 N.W. 181,
183 (1887).
171. Id.
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these communications in the interest of society. However, no positive legal
duty made them obligatory." 2
The Michigan court then referred to a more recent line of decisions that
had established an actual malice standard for media reports on matters of
public interest." 5 Although most of the cases applying this privilege involved
charges against public officials, the court determined that the social policy
underlying these decisions extended to all media communications about
matters of public concern. 1 74 Florida has explicitly extended this media
privilege to matters of public concern, irrespective of the participant's
status. 7 5 Although this privilege, secured by an actual malice standard of
fault, was developed prior to Gertz, the legitimacy of the policy considerations
6
it encompasses was not diluted by Gertz." Furthermore, Florida's adoption of
an actual malice standard in Gibson, before it was mandated by Rosenbloom, reinforces Florida's voluntary commitment to securing the dissemination of information to its citizens on matters of public concern.
The three post-Gertz state opinions that have articulated reasons for
adopting an actual malice standard for matters of public concern can be
profitably compared with Florida cases. The policy considerations enunciated
by the Indiana and Colorado courts have been adopted and applied in prior
Florida case law. Michigan's historical analysis reveals that Florida's case law
developed in an analogous, yet more direct manner. Therefore, the previous
Florida supreme court decisions would merely need to be affirmed for Florida
to be aligned with these post-Gertz states.
Invading Florida Policy with a Negligence Standard
Prior to Gertz, the United States Supreme Court rejected the use of a
reasonableness, or negligence, standard for defamation and privacy suits involving public matters. The primary reason was that the elusiveness of a
negligence standard would afford neither adequate guidance for a jury nor
the constitutional protection for speech and debate that is fundamental to
our society. "7 Allowing the jury to determine the reasonableness of a
172.

See Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 245, 21 So. 109, 112 (1896). See notes 27-28 and

accompanying text, supra.
173.

Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 161-63, 266 N.W.2d 699, 699-

700 (1978) (per curiam).
174. Id.
175.

See Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,

305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Nigro v. Miami Herald Publ. Co., 262
So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972) (actual malice standard for newspaper articles about
organized crime); Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 235 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.

1970) (actual malice standard applied to television editorials about appellant's testimony
before the city commission).
176. "In drawing the boundary for protected statements somewhere between negligent
and reckless falsehoods, the [Gertz] Court did not decide that the social value of negligent
falsehoods outweighs the conflicting social value of redressing injury to reputation, while
the value of reckless falsehoods does not." Anderson, supra note 168, at 429.
177. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring,
joined by Black, Brennan, Douglas, and White, JJ.) (rejecting Justice Harlan's reasonableness
standard).
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publisher's actions in verifying every reference to a name or picture would
create the intolerable burden of subjecting the media to indeterminate
liability for inevitable negligent error. 7 8 Self-censorship, and ultimately
frustration of the public's need to know about public affairs, were deemed
to outweigh the possibility of inadequate compensation for defamed individuals.179
Nevertheless, following the Gertz retreat, several states adopted a
negligence standard for all private individuals. Four dominant reasons have
been advanced by these states. However, juxtaposition of these rationales
with prior Florida law reveals that they are not supported in Florida's legislative or judicial policies.
One of the expressed justifications for adopting a negligence standard
was state constitutional law. For example, the Kansas 80 and Illinois''
constitutions specifically enumerate reputation, life, and property as fundamental protected rights. Because injury to property was protected by a
negligence standard, Kansas concluded that injury to reputation should be
similarly protected. 18 2 Illinois determined that the state's constitutionally
declared interest in an individual's reputation, unlike the federal counterpart, justified allowing private plaintiffs to recover for negligent injury to
their reputations. 83 Florida, however, does not constitutionally recognize the
178. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 389 (1967). See also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291 (1971) (actual malice
standard gives the publisher assurance that inevitable errors will not subject him to indeterminate liability); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968) (neither the
defense of truth nor a reasonable care standard can protect the public's stake in public
matters); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (a negligence standard creates the
danger that legitimate publications will be penalized).
179. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (an erroneous verdict in a
libel suit creates a strong impetus for self-censorship).
180. Gobin v. Globe Publ. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975). A newspaper article
erroneously stated that the plaintiff had plead guilty to a charge of cruelty to animals. The
court ultimately adopted a journalistic negligence standard for reports of judicial proceed-

ings. Id. at 233, 531 P.2d at 85.
181. Troman v. Wood, 62 IM.2d 184,-340 N.E.2d 292 (1975) (newspaper published a
photograph of plaintiff's house with an article about the suburban area criminal activities
of youth gangs, implying a gang leader lived in the house and the house served as the
gang's headquarters).
182. Gobin v. Globe Publ. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232, 531 P.2d 76. 83 (1975). The Kansas
constitution provides: "All persons, for injury suffered in person, reputation or property,
shall have remedy by due course of law .... KAN. CONSr. B. of R. §18.
2d 184, 193-95, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297-98 (1975). The Illinois
183. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.
constitution states: "[E]njoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation" are fundamental rights. ILL. CONST. art. I, §12. The court
rejected a journalistic negligence standard because it would make the prevailing practices
in the community controlling. Therefore, if the community had only one newspaper, it
2d at 196-98, 340 N.E.2d at 298-99. But&cf. Anderson,
could establish the standard. 62 Ill.
supra note 107, at 21 (May 1979) (professional negligence can be applied to journalism in
the same way it has been applied to other professions). In medical malpractice suits in
Florida the defendant is entitled to introduce expert testimony of competent practitioners
from his same medical specialty. Foster v. Thorton, 125 Fla. 699, 706, 170 So. 459, 463 (1936).
Furthermore, the locality rule has been expanded to allow expert witnesses to be from
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protection of reputation as a basic right.1 8 4 Therefore, there is no state

constitutional basis in Florida for permitting private individuals to receive
compensation for harm to their reputations under a negligence standard.
A second justification for the adoption of a negligence standard has been
the lack of prior state law requiring a higher standard for private plaintiffs 1 5
Florida, however, has a long and consistent history of affording a qualified
privilege to all matters of public concern, irrespective of the plaintiff's status.
Secured at first by an express malice standard,5 6 and later by an actual malice
standard, 1 7 the Florida courts have demonstrated a specific, voluntary' 8
commitment to the protection of publications concerning public matters.
Another reason expressed in support of a negligence standard for private
individuals is the concern that a distinction based on whether the publication involved a matter of public concern would require ad hoc judicial determinations.189 Because Florida already has an extensive and increasingly
the same or similar locality, not just the same locality. Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34, 39
(Fla. 1955).
184. The Florida constitution provides that one's inalienable rights are "the right to
enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to
acquire, possess and protect property." FLA. CONST. art. I, §2.
185. In Cahil v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975), the
Hawaii supreme court focused on the fact that its state law prior to Rosenbloom had determined that negligence was the proper standard for private plaintiffs. Id. at 533, 534 P.2d
at 1363. In Cahil a radio broadcast, discussing the plaintiff's opposition to the mayor's stiff
criminal sentences, implied that plaintiff and his family were disloyal to their country and
were Communist sympathizers. In Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546
P.2d 81 (1976), the Washington supreme court relied on the fact that prior to New York
Times malice was not an element in its state civil libel law. The change in state law
was determined to have occurred only because of the Supreme Court's mandates. Thus it
was found to be consistent with state law to return to a stricter liability standard. Id. at 44445, 569 P.2d at 84. Taskett involved a business executive who had filed for dissolution of his
corporation and went on vacation, forgetting to pay his corporation's office rent. A television
station reported that he had fraudulently used corporate funds and implied that he left
town to defraud his creditors.
186. See notes 29, 40-42 and accompanying text, supra.
187. See notes 90-95, 109-110 and accompanying text, supra.
188. See note 40 supra.
189. See Cahil v. Hawaiian Paradise Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 536, 543 P.2d 1356, 1366 (1975);
Troman v. Wood, 62 I1. 2d 184, 194-95, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297-98 (1975); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 91 (Okla. 1976).
The conclusion that a subject matter focus will invoke ad hoc determinations is diluted
in light of post-Gertz decisions which have recognized a dual standard for private and public
defamation suits. For instance, in Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1978), a magazine had published an article which mentioned plaintiff's name in association with a group of Chicago mobsters. The lower court summarily concluded that Gertz
established a negligence standard for private plaintiffs. 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
However, the district court determined that the appellant was a public figure due to his
voluntary contacts with the subject matter of the article. Id. at 445. The court noted that
defining public figures is "like trying to nail a jelly fish to the wall." Id. at 443. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for the magazine. Without concluding that a negligence standard would not apply to private individuals, the court stated:
"The nature of his reported associations and activities concerning organized crime, are,
without dispute, subjects of legitimate public concern." 580 F.2d at 861. The court concluded
that an actual malice standard should be applied to a publication involving a "public
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well-defined array of case law on this issue, adopting a negligence standard
would create the converse problem. A new doctrine of defamation law would
have to be developed in order to implement such a revised system. Several
commentators have suggested that the existing negligence law, which was
developed for physical torts, could not simply be converted into use with
the law of defamation, since the principles applied in defamation suits involving public issues must incorporate the first amendment protections of free
speech and press. 90° It is also feared that the flexibility of a negligence
standard, with its broadly defined concept of reasonable care, would unjustly
allow juries to impose their own personal standards of reasonable journalism.' 92 For this reason the Florida supreme court 92 delegated to judges the
task of determining whether or not a particular publication involved a

controversy of legitimate public concern." Id. at 862. The court seems to have broadened
the public figure category by utilizing a subject matter focus. This may be a popular
method of circumventing a state's adoption of a negligence standard.
190. Negligence in defamation cases will have to be defined more specifically than it is
defined for physical tort cases in order to preserve a minimum breathing space. Anderson,
supra note 168, at 461. Since negligence law is made ex post facto and ad hoc, precedent has
minimal influence. Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C.LA. L. REV. 464,

470-71 (1965). Tort theory and speech theory cannot be unified. There is no place for the
reasonably prudent man in the first amendment spectrum. Kalven, supra note 21, at 302,
303. See also Frakt, supra note 107, at 495 (a negligence standard would be unduly harsh
on the press).
191. See Anderson, supra note 18, at 276-79. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 366 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (a reasonable care standard will require
publishers to guess how a jury will later assess the divergent conditions of the newsgathering
system).

A journalistic negligence standard, as opposed to a simple negligence standard, will mitigate the potential for judges and juries to impose their personal journalistic preferences.
This standard would permit expert testimony on aspects of the publishing industry unfamiliar to lay persons. The reasonable man probably cannot assess the impact of wire services,
electronic editing, computers and the tremendous time pressure on the publisher's actions.
Therefore, expert witnesses from a comparable medium and school of journalism would aid
the fact-finder in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant-publisher's actions. See
Anderson, supra note 107, at 20-21 (May, 1978). Cf. Gobin v. Globe Publ. Co., 216 Kan. 228,
224, 541 F.2d 76, 84 (1975) (adopted a standard of fault of a reasonably careful publisher
from a comparable community under similar circumstances). But see Troman v. Wood, 62
Ill. 2d 184, 196-98, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298-99 (1975) (rejected a journalistic negligence standard
because practices of a single newspaper community could not be evaluated). See also Robertson,
Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 64 TEX. L.

Rav. 199, 259 n.2 (1976) (expert testimony would only be required in exceptional circumstances; a publisher's decisions are within the potential understanding of a jury).
Although a journalistic negligence standard may be a viable alternative to simple negligence for states inclined to distinguish defamation suits on the basis of the plaintiff's societal
status, it is not a sufficient solution for Florida. A negligence standard would import a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
50 (1971). This standard of proof, as opposed to the clear and convincing standard used
with actual malice, will increase the likelihood of erroneous verdicts for the plaintiff, and
consequently self-censorship. Id.
192. Firestone v. Time, Inc.,, 271 So. 2d at 751. It should be recalled that Gertz was decided
by a narrow majority. See note 118 supra. The Court may eventually return to the Rosenbloom
perspective, or some other method that would promote consistency among the states.
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matter of public concern.193 Imposing a negligence standard would displace
the judicially assigned role of securing protection for publications on public
issues.
The final justification for the adoption of a negligence standard was the
apparently limited access of private figures to channels of effective rebuttal
94
and the comparatively lesser degree of voluntariness in their public exposure.
The public official's or public figure's ability to successfully counter defamatory statements may be more tenuous than presumed by these courts. The
public official and public figure categories include persons who hold nominally
95
influential positions, and thus cannot easily command the public's attention
The effectiveness of any rebuttal depends on the defamed individual's ability
to reach and persuade the same audience that received the defamatory
publication.'96 The publisher's audience may be as inaccessible to these
peripheral public officials and public figures as it is to non-public figures. The
opportunity to rebut effectively also depends on the public's continued interest
in the event.' 97 Admittedly, some public figures may be able to sustain the
public's interest even if the event is short-lived. Inclusion in the public
official and public figure categories of persons who do not assume prominent
positions in the public's attention, however, reduces the accuracy of the
generalization that public persons can more effectively rebut defamatory
statements. 19 The Florida statutory provisions for defamation actions against
media defendants provide an incentive for the publisher to voluntarily retract
or correct by precluding the recovery of punitive damages. 1 9 The Florida
legislature has thus attempted to promote an effective means for defamed
public or private individuals to reach the publisher's audience. This legisla-

193. See, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 376 Mass. 849, 859, 330 N.E.2d 161,
168 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 90-91 (Okla. 1976); Foster v. Laredo
Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
In Stone a reporter misinterpreted an arraignment for drug possession and erroneously
identified the appellant as the accused. A news editor who knew the appellant was surprised
when he read the report, but printed the story without further confirmation. 376 Mass. at 849,
330 N.E.2d at 161. In 'Martin a newscaster broadcast false reports about a pet shop owner
and his alleged mistreatment of animals. 549 P.2d at 85. In Foster a newspaper article implied
that the private activities of an elected county surveyor involved a conflict of interest. Although the appellant was found to be a public official, the statements in question were
concluded not to be related to his official conduct. 541 S.W.2d at 814.
194. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 883 U.S. 75, 85, 89 (1966) (a former county recreational
supervisor may be a public official if he appears to the public to have control over or substantial responsibility for governmental affairs) (Douglas, J., concurring) (there is no reason
to "draw lines to exclude the night watchman, the file clerk, the typist, or for that matter,
anyone on the public payroll."); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th
Cir. 1978) (a person allegedly associated with mobsters is a public figure because organized
crime is a subject of public concern).
195. See Note, Vindication of The Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1730,

1746 (1967).
196.
197.
198.
199.

See
See
See
See

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 844 n.9 (1974).
note 46 supra.
notes 48-51 and accompanying text, supra.
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tion reduces the disparity between the public and private individual's ability
to counter defamatory statements.
The final justification for adoption of a negligence standard is voluntariness, and is also uncorroborated in Florida law. Judicial concerns about the
free flow of information .00 have necessarily precluded distinguishing publications by the manner in which the participants enlisted in the event. In Jacova
the Florida supreme court specifically refused to limit the media's qualified
privilege to report events of public interest on the basis of whether the actor's
exposure to the public was voluntary.-20 1 The Florida supreme court's determined focus on adequate protection for dissemination of news involving
matters of public concern seems to have decisively distinguished Florida
from those states that have adopted a negligence standard for private figure
defamation suits.
CONCLUSION

Pragmatically, a perfect balance cannot be achieved through the adoption
of any standard of fault to govern defamation litigation. If a negligence
standard is utilized for matters of public concern, self-censorship and foreclosure of information to the public will result. Conversely, an actual malice
standard will provide greater breathing space for the media and thus the
receipt of more varied and more complete news by the public. However, this
standard also creates the potential that the plaintiff will not be able to
prove knowing or reckless disregard although the statement is both defamatory and false. Injury to the plaintiff's reputation may have resulted, yet
there is no means by which to vindicate this injury.
Remedies must be developed that will aid the falsely defamed person
in vindicating his reputation. Plaintiffs unable to prove the requisite fault
of the publisher should be able to obtain a declaratory judgment or a special
verdict on the issue of falsity.2 0 2 Consensual right of reply statutes, although
somewhat restricted by constitutional limitations,03 might be promulgated
in an effort to satisfy the defamed individual's need to answer defamatory
charges.20 4 Remedies should also provide incentives for the media to produce
accurate, yet comprehensive reporting. Summary judgments ought to be freely
granted if the plaintiff fails affirmatively to establish the false and defamatory
200. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1955). Jacova was
subsequently relied upon in Gibson where an actual malice standard was promulgated for
matters of public interest. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 825-26 (Fla. 1970).
201. See REwTArMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §23, Special Note on Remedies for Defamation
Other than Damages (1976).
202. In Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that Florida's mandatory right to reply statute for media defamed public office candidates
was unconstitutional. The Court focused on the mandatory language of the statute. Id. at 254.
Perhaps a retraction statute could be framed in a consensual, rather than mandatory, manner.
For instance, publication of the defamed party's reply or a mutually stipulated retraction
could be used as evidence in a subsequent defamation suit to limit recovery to special damages. Thus, the retraction would serve as both an incentive to the publisher and a vindication for the defamed party.
203. See Note, supra note 195, at 1739-49.
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character of the publication. Retractions, corrections or apologies that appear
complete should not only preclude recovery of punitive damages, but also be
admitted as evidence of the publisher's sincerity and desire to mitigate the
effect of defamatory statements. Solutions promulgated along these lines would
not require Florida to retreat from its commitment to promoting an informed
society through the uninhibited receipt of news about matters of genuine
public concern. These types of remedies may be employed to supplement
the policies that have already been developed in Florida law.
NANCY
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